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Article 1

SYMPOSIUM ON THE EMERGING
ISSUES IN THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE: FEDERAL AND
NEW YORK

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
HONORABLE JOSEPH M.

McLAUGHLIN*

This volume of the St. John's Journalof Legal Commentary is a
symposium on the law of evidence. At the turn of the 20th century, a student of Professor John Chipman Gray at Harvard Law
School noted that Professor Gray warned his evidence class that
"In]o branch of law lends itself more easily to philosophical inquiries or subtlety of distinctions."1 Since the Federal Rules of Evidence went into effect in 1975, they have proven a fertile ground
for disagreement in philosophy and subtle distinction. 2 In the con* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Adjunct Professor of Law, St. John's University. A.B., 1954; LL.B, 1959, Fordham University; LL.M.,
1964, New York University; LL.D, 1981, Mercy College.
1 JOHN M. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAw 2 (1947).
2 Pursuant to Congress's delegation of power, the Supreme Court was empowered to establish rules of evidence in the federal courts that would take effect after Supreme Court
approval. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court approved the Federal Rules of Evidence and provided that the Rules become effective that
July. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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tinuing spirit of philosophical inquiries and subtle distinctions,
the Supreme Court in the last days of June 1993, decided Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 and St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.4
Under Daubert, judges have the substantial role of "gatekeeper." The judge's role as gatekeeper in jury trials is to protect
the jury from being sidetracked by unreliable, immaterial, or irrelevant evidence.
The temptation to give utterance to faulty conclusions, to conclusions based on faulty premises, to conclusions which are
merely intuitive, that inordinate desire to hear one's self talk
which the Romans styled the "Cacoethes loquendi," all these
had to be passed under censorial treatment before the tribunal could possibly mete out justice. The earliest judges must
have been impressed with the stringent necessity of making a
distinction in the mode of recounting past events between the
gossip of neighbors, however interesting, and the solemn assertion under oath of events affecting the life and liberty of
the subject.5
The aspiration of a law review should be to serve some purpose
beyond a forum for publication, although at least one person has
suggested that this is a "revolutionary proposal."6 I am told that
the editors of this volume have attempted to prepare a useful volume. Only time will demonstrate their success or failure.
The first three articles in this issue discuss the Daubert decision. Professor Edward Imwinkelried, whose views were cited in
7051-52. Nonetheless, Congress had some philosophical differences and thus suspended
the Rules effective date until it had the chance to make its changes. See Pub. L. No. 93-12,
87 Stat. 9 (1973).
After revisions were made in the Senate and House, President Gerald Ford signed the
"Conference Draft" on February 2, 1975, to take effect July 1, 1975, which would apply the
Rules to all cases except those already filed where application "would not be feasible, or
would work injustice. . . ." See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975), reprintedin 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2215. Still, philosophical differences and subtle distinctions are evident even
in these early stages. For example, the House version of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) was compromised in committee for fear that "it would face extended discussion during the Senate debate." See H.R. REP. No. 355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1092-93. However, by October of 1975, the Senate became convinced of the wisdom of the
House version and the Rule was changed. Id.
3 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
4 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
5 1 BURREL W. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 2(1)
(Horowitz rev. 1913).
6 James C. Raymond, Editing Law Reviews: Some PracticalSuggestions and a Moderately Revolutionary Proposal, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 371, 378 (1985).

1993]

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

the Court's decision, argues that had the Court ruled otherwise in
Daubert, it would have distorted the balance among Articles II,
VII, and VIII of the Rules. Next, Ronald Simon, signatory of an
amicus brief in the case, deconstructs the decision and suggests
the strategies and arguments litigants will now use to implement
the Court's decision. Finally, Robert F. Magill, Jr., addresses the
evolution of the Learned Treatise Exception in Rule 803(18), including its use in films and articles in industry publications. He
concludes by examining what effect the Daubert decision may
have on admissibility under this rule.
The next two articles discuss the Supreme Court's decision in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. Mark Schuman thoroughly
traces the Supreme Court's decisions from McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green7 through United States Postal Service Board of
Governors v. Aikens,8 climaxing with the apparent contradictions
in the Court's opinions. He shows the danger in abbreviating
terms of art, such as "burden of proof' and "pretext for discrimination" to "burden" and "pretext." The former have one accepted
meaning, the latter many. He proceeds to analyze Hicks and its
practical effect on employment discrimination litigation, concluding with a thorough and controversial discussion of the political
implications of the Hicks decision. The next article discusses the
different approaches to limitations on damage awards in employment discrimination cases when after-acquired evidence is used to
mitigate damages or to eliminate liability altogether. Robert A.
Richardson argues that after-acquired evidence should not be
used at all; alternatively, the employer should carry the burden of
persuasion as to its effect on the mitigation of damages.
In the next article, Professor Victor Gold discusses how civil unrest and racial motivations taint jury verdicts. The author argues
that, although a strong public policy of finality in jury verdicts is
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), an even stronger policy against corruption of the decision-making process is best
served if an exception is made to allow a juror to testify to racial
bias (and presumably civil unrest) in the decision-making process.
In the final article, Professor James Fagan discusses the use of
photographs in criminal trials in New York noting that the New
7 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
8 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
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York Court of Appeals has reestablished a liberal standard of admissibility. He argues, however, that this standard violates the
due process clause of the New York state constitution because it
allows for the admission of photographs that prey on the inchoate
fears of the jury, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial.
Student notes discuss the exclusionary rule in New York; the
parent-child and reporter's privilege; the act of production and the
Fifth Amendment; impeachment; and prior consistent statements.
The student section of the issue concludes with a compendium of
the New York law of evidence.
Unhappily, the efforts to establish codified rules of evidence in
New York are indefinitely stalled. The lack of a code certainly
complicates the task of collecting the New York Law of Evidence
in one place. The authors have made a major start in the right
direction.

